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Abstract 
 
This article examined the exchange rate managements in the crisis-experienced emerging 
market economies after the 1990s. First, we found that the exchange rate flexibility has increased 
from the pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period under the “soft peg” regime. Second, we 
identified a structural change in the factors for determining a reference rate in exchange rate 
management from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. Third, we found that East Asian 
countries, in their post-crisis exchange rate managements, might reduce US dollar dominance, 
while raising the other currencies’ weight, and further found that the countries who were not 
sensitive to inflation rates in their pre-crisis managements, might raise its sensitivity during the 
post-crisis period. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Exchange rate management is one of the central issues of 
macroeconomic policies. Since the postwar period, there has been a 
long-term debate over the merits of fixed versus floating exchange rates. 
The debate, which is typically framed in terms of the trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility, has gone through several swings of the 
pendulum. Recently, the debate on exchange rate regimes has become 
focused on whether or not the intermediate regimes such as target zones, 
crawling and basket pegs are vanishing, in other words, whether or not 
exchange rate regimes are moving to a corner solution with the “hard 
peg” or the “free float”. So far, no clear consensus has been reached. 
The financial crises in Mexico (1994-95), East Asia (1997-98), Russia 
(1998), and Brazil (1999) have refocused attention on exchange rate 
managements of emerging market economies. Most views expressed 
criticize the pre-crisis US dollar peg regime as one of the causes of the 
crisis. It is said that this regime induced short-term external over-borrowing 
and caused the appreciation of real exchange rates with the loss of 
competitiveness. Then, the question arises as to whether, after the crisis, 
the countries are simply returning to the pre-crisis US dollar standard, or 
whether they have learned a lesson from the crisis and are finding 
another path to follow. 
This article examines the exchange rate managements in the 
crisis-experienced emerging market economies after the 1990s. It focuses, 
as analytical sample countries, on the seven crisis-experienced countries 
among emerging market economies: Mexico, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Korea, Russia and Brazil. Specifically, the two main questions 
are these: whether the flexibility in their managed exchange rates has 
increased from the pre-crisis period (of the dollar peg system) towards the 
post-crisis period, and if so what factors have made the exchange rate 
managements more flexible in the post-crisis period. Our hypothesis is that 
the crisis-experienced countries, learning a lesson from the Asian crisis, 
have raised the flexibility of exchange rate management in the post-crisis 
period, in such a way that they, not simply relying on the US dollar 
pegging, have cared more about such other factors as inflation rate and 
currency basket including Japanese yen and the euro as the 
benchmarks for the choice of reference rates in their exchange rate 
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management. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
recent debates on exchange rate regimes and clarifies this article’s 
position among the debates. Section 3 conducts empirical studies of the 
exchange rate managements in the crisis-experienced sample countries 
after the 1990s. Section 4 presents concluding remarks.  
 
2. Recent Debates on Exchange Rate Regimes and This Article’s Position 
 
This section reviews the recent debates on exchange rate regimes: 
the corner solution hypothesis versus the “Fear of Floating” hypothesis. 
Based on the review, it clarifies this article’s position among the debates 
on exchange rate regimes. 
 
2.1 Recent Debates on Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Since the postwar period, there has been a long-term debate over 
the merits of fixed versus floating exchange rates. The debate, which is 
typically framed in terms of the trade-off between credibility and flexibility, 
has gone through several swings of the pendulum. Recently, the debates 
on exchange rate regimes have become focused on whether or not the 
intermediate regimes such as target zones, crawling and basket pegs are 
vanishing, in other words, whether or not exchange rate regimes are 
moving to a corner solution with the “hard peg” or the “free float”. 
The corner solution hypothesis1 has often been explained by the 
principle of the Impossible Trinity, that is, a country has to give up one of 
three goals: exchange rate stability, monetary independence, and 
financial market integration. Summers (1999) states that as capital market 
integration increases, countries would be forced increasingly to more 
pure floating or more purely fixed regimes. ADB (2001) explains, from the 
practical viewpoint, that large and liquid international capital markets 
make it more difficult for national authorities to support a shaky currency 
peg, since the resources of the markets far outstrip the reserves of even 
the best-armed central banks and governments.2  
The “Fear of Floating” hypothesis is a counter-argument against the 
corner solution hypothesis. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) insists that a careful 
reading of the evidence on exchange rate policy presents a strikingly 
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different picture; countries that say they allow their exchange rate to 
float mostly do not – there seems to be an epidemic case of the “fear of 
floating”, particularly among emerging market economies. They present 
an analytical model that suggests that, even in the best of times, when 
countries retain voluntary access to international capital markets, lack of 
credibility will lead to the “fear of floating”. They also found, in their 
empirical analyses across 154 exchange rate arrangements, a low 
variability of exchange rates and a high volatility of central bank reserves 
that suggest significant central bank intervention. 3 
Williamson (2000) also questions the efficacy of the two-corner 
solution by stating that the currency boards have already been 
subjected to substantial speculative pressure both in Argentina and in 
Hong Kong, and that a county with a freely floating rate may suffer from 
excess volatility of the exchange rate. He argues that the behavior of 
most of the emerging market countries is motivated not by an irrational, 
short-run “fear of floating”, but by legitimate concerns that floating will 
generate long-run misalignments. Williamson then recommends the BBC 
rules (basket, band and crawl) for emerging market economies. Kawai 
(2002), recognizing that the corner solution approach does not seem to 
be realistic in many emerging East Asian economies because of the “fear 
of floating”, states that a reasonable exchange rate policy for the region 
would be to stabilize rates to a basket of currencies consisting of the US 
dollar, the yen and the euro, given emerging East Asia’s diversified trade 
and FDI relationships with the United States, Japan, and the European 
Union and given the continued high exchange-rate volatility among the 
tri-polar currencies.4  
 
2.2 This Article’s Position in the Debates on Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
Ito (2001) states that the debate over what would be desirable 
exchange rate regimes for Asian countries seems likely to continue, 
although the selection of an exchange rate regime will be crucial for 
Asian countries’ further recovery and beyond. For the empirical analyses 
in the following section, we here clarify this article’s position among the 
fore-mentioned recent debates on exchange rate regimes. 
First, among the recent debates of Section 2.1, we follow the “Fear 
of Floating” hypothesis, considering that the corner solution approach 
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does not seem to be realistic in many emerging market economies; we 
presume that the sample countries have adopted “soft peg” regime in 
the pre- and post-crisis exchange rate managements, namely, 
intermediate regime placed between free floating and such a rigid fixed 
system as currency board. Section 3.3 will show that the sample countries 
are holding to the “soft peg” even in the post-crisis period regardless of 
their classification into the “free float”, by examining the volatility of their 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Second, we then concentrate on where are the benchmarks, the 
choice of appropriate reference rates in managed exchange rates. Our 
major concern is whether the flexibility in the managed exchange rates 
of the East Asian sample countries has increased from the pre-crisis period 
(of the dollar peg system) towards the post-crisis period. Under the 
framework of the intermediate exchange rate regime, the rising flexibility 
of exchange rate means that the benchmarks for the choice of 
reference rates in managed exchange rates may be diversified in the 
post-crisis period compared with the single benchmark of the US dollar in 
the pre-crisis period. Therefore, our specific concern on the flexibility of 
exchange rate is whether the sample countries, not simply relying on the 
US dollar, have cared more about such other factors as inflation rate and 
currency basket including the Japanese yen and the euro as the 
benchmarks for the choice of reference rates in their exchange rate 
managements during the post-crisis period. Section 3.3 will examine the 
change of exchange rate flexibility from the pre-crisis period to the 
post-crisis period, and Section 3.4 will identify the factors to make 
exchange rate managements more flexible in the post-crisis period by 
using the analytical framework of Frankel and Wei (1994) in the sample 
countries. 
Third, the theoretical background of our hypothesis that the sample 
countries have raised the flexibility of their post-crisis managed exchange 
rates comes from the principle of the Impossible Trinity. As mentioned in 
Section 2.1, Summers (1999) explains that the principle of the Impossible 
Trinity leads exchange rate regime under capital market integration to 
the two-corner solution with the “hard peg” or the “free float”. Frankel et 
al. (2000) makes a negative comment on this explanation by Summers 
(1999), by stating that economists tend to believe in interior solutions for 
most problem, and that there is nothing that prevents the government 
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from pursuing a managed float in which half of every fluctuation in 
demand for its currency is accommodated by intervention and half is 
allowed to be reflected in the exchange rate. Following this argument, 
the intermediate regime can be interpreted as an interior solution by 
giving up a bit of all three in the framework of the Impossible Trinity. As 
capital market integration increases, one of interior solutions forces 
countries to raise the flexibility of exchange rate, if monetary 
independence is kept. In the 1990s, emerging market economies 
promoted deregulation in their financial markets so that capital market 
integration deepened particularly in private sector. In this context, they 
should have made their exchange rates more flexible than the simple 
dollar pegging, even under the framework of intermediate exchange 
rate regime.5 We can, therefore, speculate that the currency crisis in the 
1990s was caused by the inconsistent policy to stick to the dollar peg 
regime (inflexible exchange rate) under the capital market integration. 
We can further presume that the crisis-experienced countries, learning a 
lesson from the crisis, have raised the flexibility of exchange rate in the 
post-crisis period. 
 
3. Empirical Studies on Crisis-experienced Countries 
 
We here conducted empirical analyses of the exchange rate 
managements in the crisis-experienced emerging market economies 
after the 1990s. We focus, as sample countries, on the hardest-hit crisis 
countries: Mexico, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Russia and 
Brazil. We exclude Malaysia because she has formally adopted the US 
dollar peg system since 1998. In this section, we first review the previous 
studies analyzing directly the post-crisis exchange rate managements in 
emerging market economies. Second, before the empirical analyses, we 
clarify the using data and the period identification of the pre-crisis period 
and the post-crisis one. Third, we examine whether exchange rate 
flexibility has really increased from the pre-crisis period towards the 
post-crisis period under the framework of intermediate exchange rate 
regime in the sample countries. Fourth, we then analyze the factors to 
make exchange rate managements more flexible in the post-crisis 
period. 
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3.1. Previous Studies 
 
In this section, we pick up some important studies on the post-crisis 
exchange rate management. First, Mckinnon (2001) analyzed how the 
post-crisis exchange rate regime has evolved since 1998. According to his 
analyses, dollar exchange rates, particularly when observed on a 
high-frequency (daily) basis, have become as stable as they were before 
the crisis. Therefore, he stated that the East Asian dollar standard, except 
for Indonesia, seems to be resurrecting itself, and that the “fear of 
floating” identified by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) is shown at higher 
frequencies to be a rational response to capital market conditions in 
emerging markets. Second, Kawai (2002) also examined the evolution of 
exchange rate arrangements in East Asia’s emerging market economies 
over the last ten years. According to his analyses, in the post crisis period 
the dollar has regained prominence in some countries (notably in 
Malaysia), while its dominance has been reduced and exchange rate 
flexibility has risen in others (notably in Indonesia). Interesting is the 
observation that Korea and Thailand appear to have shifted to a de 
facto currency basket arrangement with significant weights on the US 
dollar and the yen, similar to Singapore’s managed floating 
arrangement. 
To sum up, McKinnon (2002) argues that the post-crisis East Asian 
exchange rate managements are simply returning to the pre-crisis de 
fact dollar peg system, while Kawai (2002) insists that exchange rate 
flexibility has risen with the US dollar dominance reduced. The difference 
in the results might come from the difference in the post-crisis estimation 
periods; Kawai (2002) estimates from January 1999 to June 2002 as the 
post-crisis period, while McKinnon (2001) does from January 1999 to May 
2000. In the estimate of Kawai (2002), the significant weight-shifts from the 
US dollar to the Japanese yen in Korea and Thailand are identified mainly 
after July 2000, which is beyond the estimate period of McKinnon (2001). 
Anyhow, we have to notify that both analyses focus on the highly 
-frequent (daily) exchange rate management.  
 
3.2 Data and Period Identification 
 
Before the following empirical analyses, we first clarify the using 
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data. We use the monthly data of exchange rates and related variables 
in the sample countries, taken from the International Financial Statistics of 
the International Monetary Fund. We analyze exchange rate movements 
on monthly base, because we are concerned with not daily exchange 
rate management but such middle-term management as considering 
inflation rate as a benchmark for determining a reference rate. 
Second, we identify the pre-crisis period and the post- crisis one in 
each sample country. For this identification, we first review chronologies 
of exchange rate arrangements of sample countries after the 1990s. The 
chronologies of Table 1 are extracted from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), 
which reclassified exchange rate regimes by employing newly compiled 
monthly data set on market-determined exchange rates. Mexico, who 
suffered from the currency crisis at the end of 1994, changed its 
exchange rate arrangement from de facto peg to US dollar through free 
floating towards managed floating. Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia 
and Korea, who faced the crises in the latter half of 1997, altered their 
arrangement from de facto peg to US dollar towards managed or freely 
floating. Russia, who suffered from the crisis at the mid of 1998, changed 
its arrangement from dual market towards de facto crawling band 
around US dollar. Brazil, who faced the crisis at the beginning of 1999, 
altered its arrangement from crawling band around US dollar towards 
managed floating. From these chronologies, we find that all the sample 
countries but Russia has moved from US dollar standard arrangement in 
the pre-crisis period to more flexible arrangement in the post-crisis period. 
Based on the above-mentioned chronologies, we divide the 
sample period from January 1990 to April 20036 into the pre-crisis one and 
the post-crisis one by the crisis point, while excluding the turbulent crisis 
period (semi-annual term) with more than ten percent of monthly 
exchange rate fluctuation. Table 2 indicates the results of period partition. 
In Mexico, the pre-crisis period is from January 1990 to June 1994 and the 
post-crisis one is from January 1996 to April 2003. In Thailand, the pre-crisis 
one is from January 1990 to June 1997 and the post-crisis one is from July 
1998 to April 2003. In the Philippines, Indonesia and Korea, the pre-crisis 
one is from January 1990 to June 1997 and the post-crisis one is from 
January 1999 to April 2003. In Russia, the period in which data is available 
in IFS (IMF 2003) is from July 1995 to January 2003. Therefore, the pre-crisis 
period is from July 1995 to June 1998 and the post-crisis one is from 
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January 1999 to January 2003. Brazil, who faced the crisis in the beginning 
of 1999, had experienced the drastic change in exchange rate 
arrangement in July 1994, when the Real Plan for stabilizing exchange 
rate had been adopted. Therefore, in Brazil, the pre-crisis period is from 
July 1994 to December 1998 and the post-crisis one is from July 1999 to 
April 2003. 
 
3.3. Examining Exchange Rate Flexibility 
 
Following the period partition above, we turn to the empirical 
examination on whether exchange rate flexibility has really increased 
from the pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period under the 
framework of intermediate exchange rate regime in the sample 
countries. 
For the purpose of analyzing exchange rate flexibility, we calculate 
the coefficients of variation of monthly exchange rates per US dollar in 
both the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period, and by comparing them, 
examine whether exchange rate flexibility has increased from the 
pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period. Figure 1 simply shows the 
monthly movement of each exchange rate per US dollar during both the 
pre-crisis and the post-crisis period. Table 3 reports its coefficient of 
variation during both periods. We observe that: before the crisis, the local 
currency values per US dollar nearly level off or move stably, while after 
the crisis, they have shown monthly fluctuation; the coefficient of 
variation of all local currencies but Korea and Russia has clearly enlarged 
from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. In Korea, the pre-crisis 
coefficient of variation appears to be larger than the post-crisis one. It 
seems to be because there had been so many changes in the 
pre-announced crawling band around US dollar during the pre-crisis 
period. In fact, the pre-crisis coefficient during the period (from January 
1996 to July 1997) without any change in the crawling band is smaller 
than the post-crisis one. We can, therefore, speculate that Korea would 
have increased its exchange rate flexibility towards the post-crisis period 
without any change in the crawling band during the pre-crisis period. The 
Russian result of slightly decreasing coefficient of variation towards the 
post-crisis period, seems to be consistent with the chronology that its 
arrangement has been sifted from the pre-crisis dual market towards the 
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post-crisis de facto crawling band around US dollar. From this observation, 
we speculate that all the sample countries but Russia, who maintained 
the US dollar standard in their post-crisis exchange rate managements, 
have increased their exchange rate flexibility towards the post-crisis 
period.  
The question then arises as to whether the rising exchange rate 
flexibility is only the reflection of the sample countries’ adopting the “free 
float” or the effect of their changing exchange rate managements under 
the “soft peg” regime in the post-crisis period. In this article, we presume 
the latter case, since we follow the “Fear of Floating” hypothesis as we 
stated in Section 2.2. The previous studies of McKinnon (2001) and Kawai 
(2002) shown in Section 3.1 also argue the post-crisis exchange rate 
managements on the assumption that East Asia’s emerging market 
economies have still kept the “soft peg” even in the post-crisis period. 
According to the chronology extracted from Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002) in Table 1 of Section 3.2, Indonesia and Korea among our sample 
countries have moved towards freely floating arrangement in the 
post-crisis period, while the other sample countries have moved towards 
managed floating one or de facto crawling band around US dollar. The 
post-crisis managements of Indonesia and Korea, however, seems to be 
not so different form those of the other sample countries. We here 
examine the post-crisis volatility of foreign exchange reserves among the 
sample countries, by calculating the coefficient of variation in the 
monthly foreign exchange reserves on the US Dollar base in the post-crisis 
period. If a country adopts the regime of “pure float”, the coefficient of 
variation should, in principle, be zero. Table 4 indicates the coefficient of 
variation in the foreign exchange reserves as well as the exchange rate 
regime based on the classification by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) during 
the post-crisis period. We observe that the coefficient of variation of 
Indonesia with freely floating is almost the same as that of the Philippines 
with managed floating, and that the coefficient of variation of Korea with 
freely floating even exceeds those of the Philippines, Thailand and Brazil 
with managed floating. We therefore speculate that even Indonesia and 
Korea have adopted not purely free floating but managed floating as 
the other sample countries have. 
 
3.4. Identifying the Factors for Raising Exchange Rate Flexibility 
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The next step is to identify the factors to make exchange rate 
managements more flexible in the post-crisis period. As the previous 
section shows, all the sample countries appear to adopt “soft peg” 
regime even in the post-crisis exchange rate managements. In this 
context, the rising flexibility of exchange rate means that the benchmarks 
for the choice of reference rates in the managed exchange rates may 
be diversified in the post-crisis period compared with the single 
benchmark of the US dollar in the pre-crisis period. To verify this point, we 
conduct regression analysis to identify the factors for determining 
reference rates in managing exchange rates. We first show a regression 
model for analysis. We then clarify a method for analyzing structural 
change of exchange rate managements. We lastly present the results 
and their interpretations. 
 
Regression model 
The previous studies of McKinnon (2001) and Kawai (2002) in 
Section 3.1 use the analytical framework of Frankel and Wei (1994) in their 
analyses, on the assumption that East Asia’s emerging market economies 
have adopted the “soft peg” in the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Since 
we speculate that all the sample countries have adopted “soft peg” 
regime, we basically follow the work of Frankel and Wei (1994), but 
modify it in accordance with our analytical concern. Our specific 
concern on exchange rate management is whether the sample 
countries, not simply relying on the US dollar, have cared more about 
such other factors as currency basket including the Japanese yen or the 
euro and inflation rate as the benchmarks for the choice of reference 
rates during the post-crisis period. Unlike Frankel and Wei (1994), we take 
inflation term into account as a benchmark for a reference rate. It is 
because the strategy for the “soft peg” often involves a crawling peg or 
target in which one country’s currency is allowed to depreciate at a 
steady rate against that of another country so that its inflation rate can 
be higher than that of the country to which it is pegged. As mentioned in 
Section 2.1, Williamson (2000) recommends the BBC rules for emerging 
market economies. It states that the crawl, one of the elements of the 
BBC, is often used with a view to neutralizing differential inflation. Ohno 
(1999) also comes up with the pragmatic rules in post-crisis exchange rate 
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management, which include the rule to stabilize real effective exchange 
rate through a multiple currency basket with inflation slide. We thus focus 
on not daily but such middle-term management as considering inflation 
rate, and specify the regression model in the following way. 
 
Δlog(Local Currency/SWF)=α1Δlog(USD/SWF)+α2Δlog(JPY/ SWF) 
+α3Δlog(DEM(EURO)/ SWF)+α4Δlog(WPI3D)+ε 
 
Where SWF is the Swiss franc, USD is the US dollar, JPY is the Japanese yen, 
DEM is the German mark andεis assumed to be a well-behaved error 
term, following N(0, σ2). EURO (the euro currency) is used after the time 
of its advent, January 1999, instead of DEM. The Swiss franc is chosen as 
an arbitrary numéraire for measuring variations in the exchange rate, 
because it is an independently floating currency of an advanced 
country, which nonetheless carries little weight in the sample countries’ 
trade. WPI3D is the three-month moving average of the differential of the 
wholesale price index (WPI) of the local country from that of the 
numéraire country, Switzerland. We use the three-month moving average 
of the index because we take the causality relationship from WPI to the 
value of local currency into account. WPI is considered to be an 
appropriate price index because it has a greater weight on tradable 
goods than the consumer price index has, thereby reflecting directly 
price competitiveness. The price differential stands for the relative level of 
domestic prices to foreign countries’ prices (we here use the index of 
numéraire country, Switzerland), which can be one of the targets of 
crawling pegging. Based on the first difference of logarithms 
(percentage changes), the simple regression model is multivariate 
ordinary least squares for each country. The using data and estimating 
periods are the ones that were identified in Section 3.2. 
According to Frankel and Wei (1994), if the local currency is tightly 
fixed to some particular value of the US dollar, then the regression 
coefficientα1 should be discernable and approximately unity, while the 
others, α2 and α3, are close to 0. Another crucial variable is the WPI3D. If 
its coefficient, α4, is significantly positive, we assume that the relative 
inflation rate can be one of the factors for determining a reference rate 
in managing exchange rate. 
Before the regression, we test the stationarity of all the data series 
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by using the unit root tests of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and 
the Philips-Perron (PP) test (for the test methodology, see Matsuura and 
McKenzie 2001). Appendix 1 reports that at the one percent significance 
level, all the first-differenced data series are confirmed as stationary in 
either test, thereby suggesting that a regression analysis using all the 
first-differenced data series is valid. Appendix 2 presents the results of the 
regressions during all the estimated periods. 
 
Analytical Method: Chow’s Test and Dummy for Parameter  
We here take two steps in our analysis. First, we conduct Chow’s 
breakpoint test to examine whether there was a structural change in the 
factors for determining a reference rate in managing exchange rate 
from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. The data are broken up 
into the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis one that Section 3.2 identified 
in each sample country. By showing the F-statistics with probabilities for 
the hypothesis of parameter stability over different periods, we confirm a 
structural change from the pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period 
in each sample currency. 
Second, we then identify the factors to cause the structural 
change by examining whether each parameter in regression model has 
been significantly changed from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis 
period. For verifying the parameter change, we modify the regression 
model as follows.  
 
Δlog(Local Currency/SWF)=(α1+α’1D)Δlog(USD/SWF) 
+(α2+α’2D)Δlog(JPY/SWF)+(α3+α’3D)Δlog(DEM(EURO)/SWF) 
+(α4+α’4D)Δlog(WPI3D)+ε 
 
where D is the post-crisis dummy. In this modified regression, if some 
coefficients α’ are significant, they are the causes of a structural change 
in the post-crisis period. We can then identify the changes in factors for 
determining a reference rate in exchange rate management from the 
pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis one.  
 
Results and Interpretations 
Table 5 and Table 6 report the results of Chow’s test and the 
modified regressions. The main observations and their interpretations are 
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as follows. 
The results of Chow’s breakpoint test indicate that the hypothesis of 
parameter stability over the pre- and post-crisis periods is rejected on all 
the local currencies: Mexican new peso, Thai baht, Indonesian rupiah 
and Korean won at the one percent significance level and Philippine 
peso, Russian ruble and Brazilian real at the ten percent level. In Russian 
ruble, though its post-crisis flexibility increase was not identified in Section 
3.3, the post-crisis structural change in its exchange rate management 
was identified. The post-crisis structural change in exchange rate 
management is, therefore, verified on all the sample currencies through 
the Chow’s breakpoint test. 
The results of the modified regression on all the sample local 
currencies in which a structural change was identified above are as 
follows. First, looking at the coefficients of US dollar, the ones in the whole 
period are significantly positive and an approximately unity on all the 
local currencies. The ones with the post-crisis dummy are negative on Thai 
baht, Philippine peso, Indonesian rupiah, Korean won and Russian ruble – 
significantly negative on Thai baht, Philippine peso and Korean won, 
while positive on Mexican new peso and Brazilian real – significantly 
positive on Mexican new peso. Therefore, all the sample countries seem 
to be holding the “soft peg” to US dollar during not only the pre-crisis 
period but also the post-crisis period regardless of its assigned weights. 
During the post-crisis period, Thailand, the Philippines and Korea among 
East Asian countries appear to reduce the weight assigned to US dollar as 
a factor for determining a reference rate. On the contrary, Mexico seems 
to raise the US dollar weight in the post-crisis exchange rate 
management. 
Second, some of the coefficients of Japanese yen and the 
coefficients of euro (or Germen mark) indicate significant increases 
towards the post-crisis period. The coefficients of Japanese yen in the 
whole period are significantly positive on Thai baht and Korean won. The 
ones with the post-crisis dummy are significantly positive on Philippine 
peso and Korean won. This means that the Philippines and Korea may 
raise the weights assigned to Japanese yen towards the post-crisis period.  
The coefficients of euro (or Germen mark) with the post-crisis dummy are 
significantly positive on Thai baht and Indonesian rupiah, thereby showing 
that Thailand and Indonesia may increase the weights assigned to euro 
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(or Germen mark) towards the post-crisis period. 
Third, concerning with the coefficients of the WPI3D, the one in the 
whole period is significantly positive on Mexican new peso, Philippine 
peso and Korean won, while the ones with the post-crisis dummy are 
significantly positive on Thai baht, Indonesian rupiah, Russian ruble and 
Brazilian real. We can speculate, therefore, that the countries whose 
exchange rate managements were not sensitive to inflation rates during 
the pre-crisis period – Thailand, Indonesia, Russia and Brazil, may have 
come to take inflation rates into account as one of the factors for 
determining a reference rate towards the post- crisis period.  
To sum up, the Chow’s breakpoint test could identify a structural 
change in exchange rate management from the pre-crisis period to the 
post-crisis period in all the sample countries. The modified regression 
analysis showed that the East Asian sample countries (except Indonesia) 
might reduce the US dollar dominance while they might raise the other 
currencies’ weight (of Japanese yen or euro), in their post-crisis exchange 
rate managements. The analysis further indicated that those sample 
countries who did not show any sensitivity to inflation rates in their 
pre-crisis managements, could raise its sensitivity in the post-crisis 
managements.  
The backgrounds where the East Asian countries among the 
sample countries have shifted the weights from the US dollar to Japanese 
yen or euro in their post-crisis exchange rate managements seem to 
consist in their trade structure. Table 7 stands for the percentage 
distribution on the directions of trade of the sample countries. We found 
that the East Asian countries – Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Korea, have the percentage distribution from ten percent to twenty 
percent in the trades with the US, EU and Japan respectively, while 
Mexico, Russia and Brazil have the higher distribution in the trades with 
the US and/or EU. In this sense, it can be said that the East Asian countries 
have the well-balanced weights of trade direction among the US, EU, 
and Japan as trade partners, compared with the other sample countries. 
It seems, therefore, to be quite reasonable that the East Asian countries 
with the well-balanced trade directions may move from the single 
currency regime of the US dollar peg towards the basket currency 
regime.    
We here compare the result of the above estimation with that of 
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Kawai (2002). Kawai (2002) showed that Korea and Thailand had 
significantly shifted the weight from the US dollar to the Japanese yen in 
their post-crisis managed floating arrangement. Our estimation identified 
such a weight-shift in Korea but not in Thailand. We speculate that the 
difference in the result might mainly come from the difference in the 
frequency in exchange rate management to be analyzed; Kawai (2002) 
conducts a Frankel-Wei type of regression on a daily base for examining 
the highly- frequent exchange rate management (the original analysis by 
Frankel and Wei (1994) is on a weekly base). On the other hand, our 
analysis concentrates on the monthly exchange rate management, 
considering inflation rate as a benchmark for determining a reference 
rate. The further contribution of our estimation, which is different from that 
of Kawai (2002), is that we examined and verified sensitivity to inflation 
rates as one of the factors for determining a reference rate in the monthly 
exchange rate management. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this article, we set out to examine, conducting empirical studies, 
the exchange rate managements in the crisis-experienced emerging 
market economies after the 1990s. We focused, as analytical sample 
countries, on the seven crisis-experienced countries among emerging 
market economies: Mexico, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, 
Russia and Brazil. In analyzing the post-crisis exchange rate 
managements, the focus of questions was on whether, after the crisis, the 
crisis-experienced countries are simply returning to the pre-crisis dollar 
peg regime, or whether they have learned a lesson from the crisis and are 
finding another path to follow. Our hypothesis was that the 
crisis-experienced countries did really learn a lesson that the currency 
crisis in the 1990s was partly caused by their sticky dollar peg regimes 
under the capital market integration, and might have raised the flexibility 
of exchange rate managements in the post-crisis period. Under the 
framework of the “soft peg” exchange rate regime, the rising flexibility of 
exchange rate means that the benchmarks for the choice of reference 
rates in the managed exchange rates may be diversified in the post-crisis 
period compared with the single benchmark of the US dollar in the 
pre-crisis period. Thus, our analytical, specific concern on the flexibility of 
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exchange rate was whether the crisis-experienced countries, not simply 
relying on the US dollar pegging, had cared more about such other 
factors as inflation rates and currency basket including Japanese yen 
and euro as the benchmarks for the choice of reference rates in their 
exchange rate managements during the post-crisis period. 
Section 3, based on the fore-mentioned analytical concern, 
conducted empirical analyses on the sample countries by the following 
two steps: first, to examine exchange rate flexibility under the “soft peg” 
regime by calculating the coefficient of variation in the monthly nominal 
exchange rates during the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods, and 
foreign exchange reserves in the post-crisis periods; second, to identify 
the factors to make exchange rate movements more flexible in the 
post-crisis period by conducting regression analysis with Chow’s 
breakpoint test based on the analytical framework of Frankel and Wei 
(1994). 
The main findings from the analyses above are as follows: First, the 
trends of the coefficient of variation in the monthly nominal exchange 
rates revealed that the exchange rate flexibility of all the sample 
countries but Russia had increased from the pre-crisis period towards the 
post-crisis period. At the same time, the coefficient of variation in the 
post-crisis monthly foreign exchange reserves told us that all the sample 
countries including Indonesia and Korea might have been still holding to 
the “soft peg” regime even in the post-crisis period. This justified the 
Frankel-Wei type of regression analysis for identifying the changes in the 
factors for determining a reference rate in exchange rate management 
from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. Second, the Chow’s 
breakpoint test could identify a structural change in the factors for 
determining a reference rate in exchange rate management from the 
pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period in all the sample countries. Third, 
the regression analysis showed that the East Asian sample countries 
(except Indonesia) might reduce the US dollar dominance while they 
might raise the other currencies’ weight (of Japanese yen or euro), in 
their post-crisis exchange rate managements. The backgrounds where 
the East Asian countries have shifted the weights from the US dollar to 
Japanese yen or euro seem to consist in their well-balanced weights of 
trade direction towards the US, EU, and Japan. The regression analysis 
further indicated that those sample countries who did not show any 
 19 
sensitivity to inflation rates in their pre-crisis managements, could raise its 
sensitivity in the post-crisis managements. 
The following issues still need analysis: First, the post-crisis period after the 
1990s is a little too short to provide sufficient monthly data. We will, 
therefore, need the re-analyses to get more consolidated outcomes by 
keeping track of the upcoming data. Second, it may be useful for our 
analysis to extend to non-crisis countries and to develop through a 
comparative study between hardest-hit crisis countries and non-crisis 
countries. 
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Table 1  Chronologies for Exchange Rate Arrangements in the 1990s
Mexico
Date
Classification:
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary
Comments
December 1988 - November 11, 1991 Crawling peg/ Dual Market
November 11, 1991 - April 1992 De facto crawling peg to US Dollar The rates were unified in November 1991. The
official arrangement was an ever widening
crawling band.
May 1992 - January1994 De facto peg to US Dollar Officially there is a band. The annualized rate of
crawl of the upper limit of the band is 2.4%
through October 20, 1992 and 4.7% through June
February 1994 - December 22, 1994 Pre announced crawling band
around US Dollar
Pre-announced band becomes binding.
December 22, 1994 - March 1996 Freely falling/ Freely floating In December 1994 the parallel market premia
jumped to 27% from single digits.
April 1996 - December 2001 Managed floating
Thailand
Date
Classification:
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary
Comments
March 8, 1978 - July 1997 De facto peg to US Dollar The Baht is officially pegged to a basket of
currencies.
July 1997 - January 1998 Freely falling/ Freely floating
January 1998 - December 2001 Managed floating
Philippines
Date
Classification:
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary
Comments
March 1985 - April 1992 De facto crawling peg to US Dollar
May 1992 - April 1993 De facto band around US Dollar Band width is +/-2%.
May 1993 - August 1995 De facto band around US Dollar Band width is +/-5%.
September 1995 - June 1997 De facto peg to US Dollar
July 1997 - December 1997 Freely falling/ Freely floating Parallel market premia peaked at 17% on July
1997.December 1997 - December 2001 Managed floating
Indonesia
Date
Classification:
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary
Comments
November 16, 1978 - July 1997 De facto crawling peg to US Dollar Officially pegged to a basket of undisclosed
currencies. Premium consistently below 20% and
mostly in single digits.
August 1997 - March 1999 Freely falling/ Freely floating A dual rate comes into effect briefly in February
1998, when a subsidized rate was applied to
certain food imports.
April 1999 - December 2001 Freely floating
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Korea
Date
Classification:
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary
Comments
March 2, 1990 - September 2, 1991 Pre announced crawling band
around US Dollar
Band width +/-0.4%.
September 2 1991 - July 1, 1992 Pre announced crawling band
around US Dollar
Band width +/-0.6%.
July 1, 1992 - October 1, 1993 Pre announced crawling band
around US Dollar
Band width +/-0.8%.
October 1, 1993 - November 1, 1994 Pre announced crawling band
around US Dollar
Band width +/-0.1%.
November 1, 1994 - December 1,
1995
Pre announced crawling band
around US Dollar
Pre announced band is +/-1.5%.
December 1, 1995 - November 1997 De facto crawling peg to US Dollar Officially the pre announced band is +/-2.25%.
December 17, 1997 - June 1998 Freely falling The Won was allowed to float.
July 1998 - December 2001 Freely floating
Russia
Date
Classification:
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary
Comments
January 1992 - June 1, 1995 Freely falling/ Market There is no price data before this date.
July 6, 1995 - July 1996 Freely falling/ Market Pre announced crawling band around US Dollar
for the official rate
August 1996 - August 17, 1998 Dual Market Pre announced crawling band around US Dollar
for the official rate
August 17, 1998 - November 1999 Free falling/ Dual Market The band was widened on August 17 and
eliminated on September 2. On June 29, 1999 the
two rates are unified temporarily.
December 1999 - December 2001 De facto crawling band around US
Dollar
Band width +/-2%. There are multiple rates.
Brazil
Date
Classification:
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary
Comments
April 1989 - July 1, 1994 Freely falling/ Freely floating/
Multiple rates
On December 1989 the parallel market premium
rises to 23.5%. December 1989 - March 1990
regime is a "hyperfloat."
July 1, 1994 - May 1995 Pre-announced crawling band to
US Dollar/ Freely falling/ Dual
Market
The Real Plan has a narrow band width. The Real
replaces the Cruzado. There ia a dual market but
parallel premium during this period is trivial.
June 1995 - January 18, 1999 Pre-announced crawling band to
US Dollar/ Dual Market
February 1, 1999 - August 1999 Freely falling/ Managed floating On January 18, 1999 the two rates were unified.
September 1999 - December 2001 Managed floating
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002)
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Table 2  Pre- and Post-  Crisis Periods in Each Country
Country Currency Pre-crisis Period Post-crisis Period
Mexico Mexican new peso January 1990 - June 1994 January 1996 - April 2003
Thailand Thai baht January 1990 - June 1997 July 1998 - April 2003
Philippines Philippine peso January 1990 - June 1997 January 1999 - April 2003
Indonesia Indonesian rupiah January 1990 - June 1997 January 1999 - April 2003
Korea Korean won January 1990 - June 1997 January 1999 - April 2003
Russia Russian ruble July 1995 - June 1998 January 1999 - January 2003
Brazil Brazilian real July 1994 - December 1998 July 1999 - April 2003
Table 3  Coefficient of Variation in Currency Values per US Dollar 
Country Currency Pre-crisis Period Post-crisis Period
Mexico Mexican new peso 0.050 0.102
Thailand Thai baht 0.012 0.070
Philippines Philippine peso 0.054 0.121
Indonesia Indonesian rupiah 0.083 0.124
Korea Korean won 0.058 (0.051)1) 0.055
Russia Russian ruble 0.106 0.091
Brazil Brazilian real 0.103 0.256
Notes:
1) The coefficient of variation with a parenthesis is the one during the period from January 1996 to July
   1997, in which there was no change in the pre-announced crawling band around US Dollar.
Source: IFS (IMF 2002)
Table 4  Coefficient of Variation in Foreign Exchange Reserves during Post-crisis Period 
Country Currency C. V. Exchange Rate Regime
Mexico Mexican new peso 0.298 Managed floating
Thailand Thai baht 0.093 Managed floating
Philippines Philippine peso 0.069 Managed floating
Indonesia Indonesian rupiah 0.065 Freely floating
Korea Korean won 0.219 Freely floating
Russia Russian ruble 0.558 De facto crawling band
Brazil Brazilian real 0.108 Managed floating
Notes:
Source: IFS (IMF 2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) 
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Figure 1 Trends of Exchange Rates during Pre- and Post- Crisis Period
Mexican new peso per US Dollar
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  Source: IFS (IMF)
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  Table 5. Results of Chow's Breakpoint Test on Regression for Currency Values
F-statistic     Probability     Breakpoint
Mexican new peso 5.446 0.000  January 1996
Thai baht 5.718 0.000  July 1998
Philippine peso 2.087 0.086  January 1999
Indonesian rupiah 6.363 0.000  January 1999
Korean won 8.276 0.000  January 1999
Russian ruble 2.101 0.089  January 1999
Brazilian real 2.312 0.064  July 1999
Notes:
1) All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs.
Source: IFS (IMF 2002)
Table 6. The Results of Regressions for Currency Values including Post-crisis Dummy
USD JPY DEM/EURO WPI3D R**2 D.W.
Mexican new peso    1.04 
***   -0.04   -0.03    0.36 
*
Dummy    0.36 
***    0.08    0.12    0.15 
Thai baht    0.82 ***    0.11**    0.07    0.01 
Dummy   -0.22 ***    0.10    0.61 **    1.18 ***
Philippine peso    1.10 ***   -0.11    0.12    0.32 **
Dummy   -0.30 **    0.25 **    0.55    0.65 
Indonesian rupiah    0.95 
***    0.02    0.06    0.38 
Dummy    -0.04   -0.42 
*
   1.85 
**
   1.98 
***
Korean won    0.87 
***
   0.09 
**    0.01    0.76 
**
Dummy   -0.29 ***    0.46 ***    0.14    -0.16 
Russian ruble    0.96 ***   -0.07    0.06    0.09 
Dummy   -0.04    0.13   -0.53    0.30 **
Brazilian real    1.05 ***   -0.01    0.15   -0.17 
Dummy    0.12   -0.07    0.18    1.08 
***
Notes:
1) All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs.
2) The estimation period is both the pre-crisis one and the post-crisis one.
3) "Dummy" is for the post-crisis period.
4) *, **, ***  indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels,
   respectively.
Source: IFS (IMF 2002)
0.84 1.88
0.56 1.73
0.87 1.16
0.86 1.23
0.76 1.48
0.73 0.97
0.49 1.49
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Table 7. Percent Distribution on Direction of Trade (%)
Mexico Thailand Philippines Indonesia Korea Russia Brazil
U.S.A. 75.8 14.8 21.7 12.2 17.8 5.4 24.1
EU 6.6 13.0 12.4 14.1 12.3 32.1 26.2
Japan 3.0 18.7 17.0 19.7 14.3 1.6 4.1
Notes:
1) Trade in this table shows the sum of exports and imports in the US dollar term.
2) Column indicates each sample country's trade share with partners of the U.S.A, EU, and Japan.
Sources: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2003, IMF.
Appendix 1 Unit Root Tests on Data for Regression
Intercept Trend and Intercept Intercept Trend and Intercept
 ⊿log(Mexican new peso/SWF)     -7.59 ***     　-7.56 ***     -8.43 ***     　-8.40 ***
 ⊿log(Thai baht/SWF)     -8.23 ***     　-8.20 ***     -6.32 ***     　-6.31 ***
 ⊿log(Philippine peso/SWF)     -7.32 ***     　-7.29 ***     -8.11 ***     　-8.08 ***
 ⊿log(Indonesian Rupiah/SWF)     -9.15 ***     　-9.13 ***     -9.24 ***     　-9.21 ***
 ⊿log(Korean won/SWF)     -7.74 ***     　-7.73 ***     -8.75 ***     　-8.72 ***
 ⊿log(Russian ruble/SWF)     -7.38 ***     　-7.37 ***     -7.84 ***     　-7.87 ***
 ⊿log(Brazilian real/SWF)     -5.11 ***     　-5.07 ***     -6.13 ***     　-6.11 ***
 ⊿log(USD/SWF)     -8.13 ***     　-8.11 ***     -9.00 ***     　-8.97 ***
 ⊿log(JPY/SWF)     -8.25 ***     　-8.33 ***     -9.48 ***     　-9.49 ***
 ⊿log(DEM(EURO)/SWF)     -7.61 ***     　-7.58 ***     -9.91 ***     　-9.88 ***
 ⊿log(WPI3D) Mexico/SWF     -4.50 ***     　-4.74 ***     -4.05 ***     　-4.10 ***
 ⊿log(WPI3D) Thailand/SWF     -6.29 ***     　-6.28 ***     -3.71 ***     　-4.68 ***
 ⊿log(WPI3D) Philippines/SWF     -5.58 ***     　-5.71 ***     -5.57 ***     　-5.67 ***
 ⊿log(WPI3D) Indonesia/SWF     -8.48 ***     　-8.44 ***     -3.98 ***     　-3.96 ***
 ⊿log(WPI3D) Korea/SWF     -6.52 ***    　 -6.45 ***     -4.83 ***     　-4.79 ***
 ⊿log(WPI3D) Russia/SWF     -3.56 ***     　-3.42 *     -3.45 **     　-3.18 *
 ⊿log(WPI3D) Brazil/SWF     -3.08 **     　-3.32 *     -6.39 ***       -7.11 ***
Notes:
1) The lag truncation is one quarter in the ADF test, and three quarters in the PP test.
2) ***, **, and * indicate rejection of the null of nonstationarity at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
   and 10 percent significance levels with critical values taken from Davidson and
   MacKinnon (1993).
Source: IFS(IMF)
Variables ADF Statistic PP Statistic
Appendix 2 Results of Regressions in All the Estimated Periods
USD JPY DEM/EURO WPI3D R**2 D.W.
Mexican new peso    1.23 ***   -0.00   -0.05    0.43 *** 0.82 1.83
Thai baht    0.72 ***    0.14 ***    0.25 **    0.40 ** 0.84 1.15
Philippine peso    1.01 ***   -0.04    0.26    0.40 *** 0.75 1.41
Indonesian rupiah    0.80 ***   -0.04    0.58 *    1.50 *** 0.49 1.73
Korean won    0.80 
***
   0.24 
***   -0.01    0.77 
*** 0.84 1.34
Russian ruble    0.99 ***   -0.04   -0.15    0.25 *** 0.72 0.88
Brazilian real    1.13 
***   -0.06    0.17    0.52 
*** 0.46 1.34
Notes:
1) All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs.
2) *, **, ***  indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels,
   respectively.
Source: IFS (IMF 2002)
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Notes 
 
1. As the latest study, Fischer (2001) discusses the corner solution hypothesis. 
2. In addition to the fore-mentioned arguments, some studies simply support floating 
exchange rate regimes. For example, Mussa et al. (2000) argued that floating regimes 
appear to have been helpful in handling a variety of economic shocks for many 
emerging market countries, by stating that the policy requirements for maintaining a 
pegged exchange rate can be very demanding in circumstances of high 
international capital mobility as seen in the tequila crisis of 1995 and the 
Asian/Russian/Brazilian crises of 1997-98. Eichengreen (1999) also stated that the IMF 
should more forcefully press for the adoption of more flexible exchange rates by most 
of its developing country members, especially by those with open capital accounts. 
3. Masson (2000) also made a careful statistical examination of the way in which 
countries have changed their exchange rate regime over the years. He found that, 
although there has been some tendency for countries to polarize toward the extremes, 
it is far weaker than one would infer from the sort of summary of Latin American 
experience.  
4. French and Japanese staff (2002) also argued that a possible solution for many 
emerging market economies could be a managed floating exchange rate regime 
whereby the currency moves within a given band with its center targeted to a basket 
of currencies including the dollar, the yen and the euro. 
5. As for the analyses of the negative impacts of the dollar peg system on the external 
balances in the selected East Asian countries, see Taguchi (2003a) and Taguchi 
(2003b). 
6. April 2003 is the latest point in data availability in IFS (IMF 2003). 
 
 
 
 
